Computer security classification in os

Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria ( TCSEC) is a The TCSEC, frequently referred to as the Orange Book, is the centerpiece of the DoD [ citation needed] History [ ] Work on the Orange book began in 1979. In 1999, the Orange book was replaced by the On 24 October 2002, The Orange Book (aka DoDD 5200.28-STD) was canceled by DoDD 8500.1, which was later reissued as DoDI 8500.02, on 14 March 2014. Fundamental objectives and requirements [ ] Policy [ ] The security policy must be explicit, well-defined, and enforced by the computer system. Three basic security policies are specified: • Mandatory Security Policy – Enforces • Marking – Systems designed to enforce a mandatory security policy must store and preserve the integrity of access control labels and retain the labels if the object is exported. • Discretionary Security Policy – Enforces a consistent set of rules for controlling and limiting access based on identified individuals who have been determined to have a need-to-know for the information. Accountability [ ] Individual accountability regardless of policy must be enforced. A secure means must exist to ensure the access of an authorized and competent agent that can then evaluate the accountability information within a reasonable amount of time and without undue difficulty. The accountability objective includes three requirements: • Identification – The process used to recognize an individual user. • Authentication – The verification of an individual user's auth...

• العربية • Azərbaycanca • Български • Català • Čeština • Deutsch • Eesti • Español • Euskara • فارسی • Français • 한국어 • Bahasa Indonesia • Italiano • עברית • Lombard • Magyar • Македонски • മലയാളം • Nederlands • 日本語 • Polski • Português • Română • Русский • Slovenčina • کوردی • Türkçe • Українська • Tiếng Việt • 中文 • v • t • e An exploit (from the English verb to exploit, meaning "to use something to one’s own advantage") is a piece of Classification [ ] There are several methods of classifying exploits. The most common is by how the exploit communicates to the vulnerable software. A remote exploit works over a network and exploits the security vulnerability without any prior access to the vulnerable system. A local exploit requires prior access to the vulnerable system and usually increases the privileges of the person running the exploit past those granted by the system administrator. Exploits against client applications also exist, usually consisting of modified servers that send an exploit if accessed with a client application. A common form of exploits against client applications are Exploits against client applications may also require some interaction with the user and thus may be used in combination with the Many exploits are designed to provide superuser-level access to a computer system. However, it is also possible to use several exploits, first to gain low-level access, then to escalate privileges repeatedly until one reaches the highest administrative level (...

Information systems are frequently exposed to various types of threats which can cause different types of damages that might lead to significant financial losses. Information security damages can range from small losses to entire information system destruction. The effects of various threats vary considerably: some affect the confidentiality or integrity of data while others affect the availability of a system. Currently, organizations are struggling to understand what the threats to their information assets are and how to obtain the necessary means to combat them which continues to pose a challenge. To improve our understanding of security threats, we propose a security threat classification model which allows us to study the threats class impact instead of a threat impact as a threat varies over time. This paper addresses different criteria of information system security risks classification and gives a review of most threats classification models. We define a hybrid model for information system security threat classification in order to propose a classification architecture that supports all threat classification principles and helps organizations implement their information security strategies. • Previous article in issue • Next article in issue

• العربية • Azərbaycanca • Български • Català • Čeština • Deutsch • Eesti • Español • Euskara • فارسی • Français • 한국어 • Bahasa Indonesia • Italiano • עברית • Lombard • Magyar • Македонски • മലയാളം • Nederlands • 日本語 • Polski • Português • Română • Русский • Slovenčina • کوردی • Türkçe • Українська • Tiếng Việt • 中文 • v • t • e An exploit (from the English verb to exploit, meaning "to use something to one’s own advantage") is a piece of Classification [ ] There are several methods of classifying exploits. The most common is by how the exploit communicates to the vulnerable software. A remote exploit works over a network and exploits the security vulnerability without any prior access to the vulnerable system. A local exploit requires prior access to the vulnerable system and usually increases the privileges of the person running the exploit past those granted by the system administrator. Exploits against client applications also exist, usually consisting of modified servers that send an exploit if accessed with a client application. A common form of exploits against client applications are Exploits against client applications may also require some interaction with the user and thus may be used in combination with the Many exploits are designed to provide superuser-level access to a computer system. However, it is also possible to use several exploits, first to gain low-level access, then to escalate privileges repeatedly until one reaches the highest administrative level (...

Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria ( TCSEC) is a The TCSEC, frequently referred to as the Orange Book, is the centerpiece of the DoD [ citation needed] History [ ] Work on the Orange book began in 1979. In 1999, the Orange book was replaced by the On 24 October 2002, The Orange Book (aka DoDD 5200.28-STD) was canceled by DoDD 8500.1, which was later reissued as DoDI 8500.02, on 14 March 2014. Fundamental objectives and requirements [ ] Policy [ ] The security policy must be explicit, well-defined, and enforced by the computer system. Three basic security policies are specified: • Mandatory Security Policy – Enforces • Marking – Systems designed to enforce a mandatory security policy must store and preserve the integrity of access control labels and retain the labels if the object is exported. • Discretionary Security Policy – Enforces a consistent set of rules for controlling and limiting access based on identified individuals who have been determined to have a need-to-know for the information. Accountability [ ] Individual accountability regardless of policy must be enforced. A secure means must exist to ensure the access of an authorized and competent agent that can then evaluate the accountability information within a reasonable amount of time and without undue difficulty. The accountability objective includes three requirements: • Identification – The process used to recognize an individual user. • Authentication – The verification of an individual user's auth...

Information systems are frequently exposed to various types of threats which can cause different types of damages that might lead to significant financial losses. Information security damages can range from small losses to entire information system destruction. The effects of various threats vary considerably: some affect the confidentiality or integrity of data while others affect the availability of a system. Currently, organizations are struggling to understand what the threats to their information assets are and how to obtain the necessary means to combat them which continues to pose a challenge. To improve our understanding of security threats, we propose a security threat classification model which allows us to study the threats class impact instead of a threat impact as a threat varies over time. This paper addresses different criteria of information system security risks classification and gives a review of most threats classification models. We define a hybrid model for information system security threat classification in order to propose a classification architecture that supports all threat classification principles and helps organizations implement their information security strategies. • Previous article in issue • Next article in issue • About ScienceDirect • Remote access • Shopping cart • Advertise • Contact and support • Terms and conditions • Privacy policy We use cookies to help provide and enhance our service and tailor content and ads. By continuing yo...